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THOMAS A. BALMER* 
Some Thoughts on Proportionality 
he framers of the Oregon Constitution gave little reported 
attention to many of the provisions that they included in that 
document.  Among the provisions that did not generate debate was the 
“proportionality” requirement of article I, section 16.  That provision 
provides that “all penalties shall be proportioned to the offense.”1  
The framers, who used the Indiana Constitution of 1851 as the source 
for much of the Oregon Constitution—including article I, which the 
framers identified as a “Bill of Rights”—took both the proportionality 
requirement and the prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishment” 
from that document.2  The section containing these provisions was in 
the first draft of the Oregon Constitution that was introduced at the 
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University of Chicago, 1977.  I am grateful to Brad Nicholson and Akaash Gupta for their 
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the Oregon Supreme Court in State v. Wheeler, 343 Or. 652, 175 P.3d 438 (2007), which 
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1 Article I, section 16 provides, in part: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed.  Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted, but all 
penalties shall be proportioned to the offense.”  OR. CONST. art. I, § 16. 
 The use of the conjunction “but” between the prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishments and the proportionality requirement raises the question whether the latter is 
intended to contrast with or be an exception to the former.  However, the Oregon Supreme 
Court appears to be correct in concluding that, because the two clauses refer to different 
concepts, each of which could stand alone as a constitutional requirement, the clauses 
“should be interpreted independently, although the interpretation of one may inform the 
interpretation of the other.”  Wheeler, 343 Or. at 656, 175 P.3d at 441. Thus, as used in 
article I, section 16, the word “but” appears “simply [to] be serving its ordinary function as 
a conjunction, viz., joining the two clauses into a single sentence without purporting to 
define the particular relationship between them—whatever it may be.”  Id. 
2 THE OREGON CONSTITUTION AND PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1857, at 468 (Charles Henry Carey ed., 1926); W.C. 
Palmer, The Sources of the Oregon Constitution, 5 OR. L. REV. 200, 201 (1926). 
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constitutional convention.  Although it apparently was omitted 
(perhaps by mistake) at one point in the proceedings, it reappeared 
and was included in the final draft—all without reported discussion.3 
Yet the concept of proportionality in criminal punishment has a 
philosophical heritage dating back millennia and a well-documented 
history as a constitutional principle, beginning with the earliest 
American state constitutions.  This Article reviews the ancient 
concept of proportionality in punishment and turns to the more 
systematic application of this concept in the mid-18th century by 
Cesare Beccaria and William Blackstone and to current discussions of 
“just deserts” as a theory of criminal punishment.  The Article then 
returns to the historical development of the constitutional requirement 
that criminal punishments be proportional to the offense, both in the 
explicit form in which the requirement is found in several state 
constitutions and as some decisions have interpreted the prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment found in the Eighth 
Amendment and in many state constitutions.  With this background, 
the Article considers the Oregon cases interpreting the proportionality 
provision of article I, section 16, and concludes with an attempt to 
outline the approach these cases take in interpreting and applying 
Oregon’s proportionality provision. 
I 
THE CONCEPT OF PROPORTIONALITY 
The idea that there should be some proportional relationship 
between a crime and the crime’s punishment dates back at least to the 
Code of Hammurabi and the Mosaic codes that appear in the Old 
Testament.4  In the familiar words of the Book of Exodus, “[T]hou 
shalt give life for life, Eye for eye, tooth for tooth . . . .”5  This form 
of proportionality suggests that a punishment is appropriate if it is 
similar in magnitude to the crime.  It rests on the intuitive moral 
notion that one “fair” means of punishing the wrongdoer is to inflict 
the same kind and degree of harm that was inflicted on the victim.  It 
furthers one significant purpose of criminal law—retribution against 
the wrongdoer for the harm he or she caused the innocent victim and 
society as a whole.  Although the “eye for an eye” approach has 
 
3 Claudia Burton & Andrew Grade, A Legislative History of the Oregon Constitution of 
1857 – Part I, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 469, 521–26 (2001). 
4 Jeremy Waldron, Lex Talionis, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 25, 26 (1992). 
5 Exodus 21:23–24 (King James). 
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serious limitations in practice,6 its common sense appeal to earlier 
societies is obvious, and continues to resonate as a principle for 
setting penalties for criminal offenses.  Indeed, the “eye for an eye” 
proportionality principle is at least one rationale underlying the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Kennedy v. Louisiana, holding that 
the imposition of the death penalty for child rape is unconstitutional.7 
Although the traditional “eye for an eye” formulation of 
proportionality, generally referred to as lex talionis, often is 
associated with the retributive purpose of punishment—you inflicted 
harm on an innocent person; the state (or society) will now have 
retribution against you by inflicting the same harm on you—it also is 
consistent with other purposes of punishment.  An “eye for an eye” is 
a powerful deterrent to criminal conduct and a means of 
incapacitating a criminal in a way that prevents recidivism—both 
important concerns in protecting public safety.8  Thus, proportionality 
may play a role even in a more utilitarian view of criminal 
punishment.9 
A moment’s reflection, however, suggests that the most basic “eye 
for an eye” formulation that focuses solely on the injury caused by the 
wrongdoer, is too simplistic a means of establishing a “proportional” 
 
6 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 13 (1769) 
(“[T]here are very many crimes, that will in no shape admit of these penalties, without 
manifest absurdity and wickedness.  Theft cannot be punished by theft, defamation by 
defamation, forgery by forgery, adultery by adultery, and the like.”); see also Alice 
Ristroph, Proportionality As a Principle of Limited Government, 55 DUKE L.J. 263, 281 
(2005). 
7 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2646 (2008).  The Court held that the death penalty “must be limited 
to those offenders who commit a narrow category of the most serious crimes and whose 
extreme culpability makes them the most deserving of execution.”  Id. at 2650 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Although the Court based its decision in substantial part on 
what it described as “objective indicia of consensus against making [the crime of child 
rape] punishable by death,” id. at 2651, the imposition of the death penalty for a crime that 
did not cause death obviously played a significant role in the Court’s decision.  See id. at 
2658 (“Evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society 
counsel us to be most hesitant before interpreting the Eighth Amendment to allow the 
extension of the death penalty, a hesitation that has special force where no life was taken 
in the commission of the crime.”) (emphasis added). 
8 This point is carefully made by Alice Ristroph, who identifies Cesare Beccaria and 
Jeremy Bentham as supporting proportionality in punishment as a means of achieving the 
utilitarian end of preventing future criminal conduct.  Ristroph, supra note 6, at 272–79. 
9 Ristroph states that proportionality does not serve the utilitarian purpose of 
incapacitation.  Id. at 277.  However, at least as practiced in ancient societies, the loss of a 
hand or an eye would certainly seem to affect the capacity to engage in later criminal 
conduct.  She is on firmer ground in arguing that the penological goal of rehabilitation 
seems to lack an internal proportionality principle.  Id. 
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penalty.10  Certainly, the wrongdoer’s mens rea and the actus reus, as 
well as the resulting injury, are relevant in determining whether a 
punishment is appropriately “proportional.”11  If the wrongdoer did 
not intend to kill, for example, but was only reckless in engaging in 
the conduct that led to the victim’s death, the wrongdoer may not 
“deserve” the death penalty.  And if the killing was in self-defense, 
the killer may not be guilty of a crime at all.  For these reasons, the 
underlying moral foundation of “proportional” punishment ordinarily 
requires at least some consideration of the circumstances in which the 
conduct occurred and the culpability of the defendant.12  These 
concerns quickly move the proportionality concept from an “eye for 
an eye” to a focus on the proportionality between the crime or offense 
—a concept that includes the mental state of the wrongdoer, other 
circumstances of the crime, and the victim’s injury—and the 
punishment.  This is the more typical modern formulation, and it 
appears in the notion that the punishment should “fit the crime” or, as 
article I, section 16 of the Oregon Constitution puts it, that the penalty 
must be “proportioned to the offense.” 
In some formulations, particularly those based on a more utilitarian 
view of punishment, a full proportionality inquiry takes into 
consideration individual characteristics of the offender.  What 
punishment imposed on this offender would be proportional to his or 
her crime?  In addition to serving society’s prerogative of retribution 
 
10 Early legal systems often focused exclusively on the victim’s injury and the act or 
even the object that directly caused the injury.  Greek, Judaic, and Babylonian law 
provided that if an animal or an inanimate object caused the death of a person, the animal 
or object would be destroyed or cast beyond the country’s borders.  See OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 8, 10–11, 19 (1881). 
11 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at 13 (“[I]n general, the difference of persons, place, 
time, provocation, or other circumstances, may enhance or mitigate the offence; and in 
such cases retaliation can never be a proper measure of justice.”). 
12 This aspect of proportionality appears to underlie, at least in part, the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decisions that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of a person 
convicted of murder who is not mentally competent.  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 
(2002).  Or the execution of a person who was under the age of eighteen at the time he or 
she committed the crime.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).  As in Kennedy, the 
Court in those cases examined whether different jurisdictions permitted the death penalty 
in order to determine whether such a punishment was “unusual,” but also focused on the 
way the defendants’ mental capacity (in Atkins) or age (in Roper) affected their 
culpability.  This focus suggests that the Court was concerned that the death penalty, even 
if proportionate for the crime of murder, might be disproportionate for a murder 
committed by a person not mentally competent or by a minor. 
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against the offender for the crime, what punishment would deter this 
offender from future criminal conduct?13 
Despite its ancient pedigree, the concept of proportionality as a 
factor limiting the severity of criminal punishments played little role 
in the criminal justice system in England in the Middle Ages.  Typical 
punishments included branding, banishment, fines, and whipping.14  
English criminals probably would have preferred the “eye for an eye” 
standard since, by the time Blackstone was writing in the 1760s, 
English law prescribed the death penalty for more than 160 different 
crimes, ranging from murder to hunting on certain lands or cutting 
down certain trees.15  It was against this background that Blackstone 
forcefully asserted the need for proportion between a crime and the 
punishment.  Blackstone followed Beccaria who, writing in the 
Enlightenment tradition and a few years before Blackstone,16 argued 
against the indiscriminate application of the death penalty and in 
favor of considering aggravating and extenuating circumstances in 
determining criminal punishments, as well as whether a particular 
penalty would be effective in preventing future crimes.17 
Blackstone asserted that punishment should be proportional to the 
offense and based on the social ends of criminal punishment 
generally: “The method . . . of inflicting punishment ought always to 
be proportioned to the particular purpose it is meant to serve, and by 
no means to exceed it . . . .”18  For Blackstone, the primary purpose of 
punishment was the prevention of future crime.  This would be 
accomplished by penalties that led to the “amendment of the offender 
himself,” “by deterring others by the dread of his example from 
offending in the like way,” and “by depriving the party injuring of the 
power to do future mischief”—by death, exile, slavery, or life 
imprisonment.19  He criticized lex talionis for punishments that were 
too severe in some circumstances while too lenient in others; 
 
13 See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 264–69 (1968). 
14 BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at 370; see also 11 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY 
OF ENGLISH LAW 556–80 (1938). 
15 BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at 18–19, 244. 
16 CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Henry Paolucci trans., 1963) 
(1768). 
17 BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at 15–16. 
18 Id. at 12. 
19 Id. at 11–12.  For Blackstone, retribution—“atonement or expiation for the crime 
committed”—was not the purpose of “human punishment,” “for that must be left to the 
just determination of the supreme being.”  Id. at 11. 
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Blackstone urged a more rational application of the proportionality 
principle that took into account the offender’s mental state, the 
victim’s circumstances, and other contextual factors.20  He also 
severely criticized England’s reliance on the death penalty as a 
punishment for so many crimes: 
It is a kind of quackery in government, and argues a want of solid 
skill, to apply the same universal remedy, the ultimum supplicium, 
to every case of difficulty.  It is, it must be owned, much easier to 
extirpate than to amend mankind: yet that magistrate must be 
esteemed both a weak and a cruel surgeon, who cuts off every limb, 
which through ignorance or indolence he will not attempt to cure.21 
Blackstone argued that the legislature should adopt punishments 
that were proportional to the offense, based on the considerations 
mentioned above, but he recognized that “there cannot be any regular 
or determinate method of rating the quantity of punishments for 
crimes, by any one uniform rule; but they must be referred to the will 
and discretion of the legislative power.”22  And, again by citing 
Beccaria, he called for an approach that looks similar to the kinds of 
modern sentencing guidelines used throughout the United States: 
[I]n every state a scale of crimes should be formed, with a 
corresponding scale of punishments, descending from the greatest 
to the least: but, if that be too romantic an idea, yet at least a wise 
legislator will mark the principal divisions, and not assign penalties 
of the first degree to offences of an inferior rank.23 
Blackstone distinguished his argument for proportionality from 
what he saw as the irrationality of lex talionis and overreliance on the 
death penalty and articulated the purposes of punishment as 
fundamentally utilitarian.  But his concept of proportionality was 
consistent with the retributive purpose of criminal law: is not the 
moral aspect of criminal punishment best served by a punishment that 
is proportional to the seriousness of the offense?  Thus, both those in 
favor of a utilitarian approach to punishment and those focused more 
on retribution for criminal acts could support Blackstone’s argument 
that punishments should be proportioned to the offense. 
In England, Blackstone’s views on proportionality became the 
basis for an exclusively utilitarian view of punishment in the works of 
 
20 Id. at 12–18. 
21 Id. at 17–18. 
22 Id. at 14–15. 
23 Id. at 18. 
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Austin and Bentham.  Bentham, for example, explicitly departed from 
the idea of a moral or retributive aspect of punishment.  Rather, 
punishment for past crimes would be calibrated to prevent future 
crimes through reformation of the defendant, deterrence, or 
incapacitation.24 
Meanwhile, in the United States, Blackstone’s views—and 
sometimes his very words—about proportionality in sentencing were 
finding their way into the new state constitutions, as we will discuss 
in greater detail below.  The framers of both the U.S. Constitution and 
early state constitutions (often the same people) were aware of the 
thinking of Blackstone, Beccaria, and others with respect to 
proportionality in criminal punishment and the ends the criminal 
justice system should serve.  Ronald Pestritto argues that while some 
of the framers, particularly those most closely associated with 
Enlightenment thought, like Jefferson, took a utilitarian approach to 
criminal punishment, others, such as Madison and Washington, 
emphasized retribution and the moral imperative of punishment for 
wrongdoing as a critical component of criminal justice.25  Although 
the framers’ views on criminal punishment may have differed, the 
concept of proportionality was well known to them and played an 
important part in their constitution drafting in the late 1700s. 
More than 200 years later, the debate over the principles of 
criminal punishment continues.  Public opinion toward crime and 
punishment has shifted back and forth.  The variables underlying 
these shifts include economic and immigration trends, social 
dislocation, and underlying crime rates, along with the concepts of 
retribution, reformation, and public safety, all playing varying roles in 
criminal law.  But, through the middle of the twentieth century, policy 
makers and the public generally embraced a rehabilitation-based 
approach to punishment.26  This approach favored punishments that 
were intended to reform criminals and deter future crimes, rather than 
to mete out retribution against the wrongdoer.  Indeed, from statehood 
until 1996, the Oregon Constitution stated that “[l]aws for the 
punishment of crime shall be founded on the principles of 
reformation, and not of vindictive justice.”27  A key aspect of the 
 
24 PACKER, supra note 13, at 40–45. 
25 RONALD J. PESTRITTO, FOUNDING THE CRIMINAL LAW: PUNISHMENT AND 
POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA (2000). 
26 ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING 8–10 (3d ed. 2004). 
27 OR. CONST. art. I, § 15 (1857).  This provision currently reads, “Laws for the 
punishment of crime shall be founded on these principles: protection of society, personal 
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reformative or rehabilitative approach was indeterminate sentencing, 
in which statutes gave the sentencing judge broad discretion in setting 
the length of sentence, using various factors related to the 
circumstances of the crime and the offender.  Moreover, parole boards 
often were given discretion to release incarcerated criminals based on 
behavior in prison and an assessment of the individual’s likelihood of 
re-offending.28 
By the 1970s, however, disenchantment with the rehabilitation-
based approach of indeterminate sentencing spread, along with 
concerns about rising crime rates and inconsistent and arbitrary 
sentencing patterns.29  Some criminal justice theorists reinvigorated a 
morals-based retributivist theory of sentencing, which became known 
as the “just deserts” approach.  This theory responded to what some 
observers perceived as the inequality and harshness of utilitarian 
sentencing, as well as to the popular concern that the criminal justice 
system was, in many instances, unable to assess when “reformation” 
had occurred or when an offender could be released, consistent with 
public safety.30  Scholars argued that, under a utilitarian scheme, 
some offenders were forced “to suffer, unequally, to achieve [the 
common] good.”31  In contrast, just deserts centered on morality: the 
criminal has done wrong, and the state must punish him to the extent 
of his moral culpability.  Presumably then, the criminal “gets what he 
deserves”—no more, no less. 
Just deserts proponents argued that the appropriate focus of 
sentencing is the defendants’ moral culpability for the prior acts 
committed.  This is in contrast to utilitarians who emphasized 
individual characteristics to determine the possible future acts of 
defendants.  By concentrating on the blameworthiness of the 
defendants, they maintained, equality in sentencing could be achieved 
because similar acts would merit similar blame.32  Proponents also 
 
responsibility, accountability for one’s actions and reformation.”  OR. CONST. art. I, § 15 
(2008). 
28 CAMPBELL, supra note 26, at 10; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 159–63, 304–05 (1993). 
29 FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY 
AND SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981); CAMPBELL, supra note 26, at 10–17; FRIEDMAN, supra 
note 28, at 305–09. 
30 See Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 
35 PUB. INT. 22, 25 (1974). 
31 RICHARD G. SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY AND 
DESERT 15 (1979). 
32 Id. at 17. 
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claimed that just deserts better comported with notions of 
proportionality—albeit “rough” proportionality—than did 
indeterminate sentencing.  Just deserts theory, by focusing on the 
offense rather than the offender, required proportionality between 
crimes (more serious crimes merited more serious punishment) and in 
determining the ultimate magnitude of punishment for each particular 
crime (the severity of punishment would reflect the seriousness of the 
crime).33 
Norval Morris’s “limited retributivism” theory, partially adopted 
by the tentative draft of the new Model Penal Code on sentencing,34 
answers questions about how one determines the seriousness of any 
given crime by modifying just deserts theory.  Under Morris’s 
scheme, just deserts considerations, based on society’s views of 
blameworthiness and retribution, frame the maximum and minimum 
sentences available for any given crime, while utilitarian 
considerations determine the specific sentence within that range.35  
To borrow from the U.S. Supreme Court,36  Morris’s theory attempts 
to avoid, at least, “grossly disproportionate” sentences.  Opponents of 
the Model Penal Code draft argue that the focus on blameworthiness 
tilts sentencing away from public safety as a purpose to guide 
sentencing, leaving primarily retribution, with a constrained form of 
proportionality, as the only limiting principle.37 
As rehabilitation-based theories of criminal sentencing gave way to 
a more “just deserts,” morals-based approach, state and federal 
legislatures and courts were also making changes in actual sentencing 
practices.  Indeterminate sentences, which had predominated for 
 
33 Id. at 27–28 (citation omitted). 
34 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2), Reporter’s Note at 30–33 (tentative 
draft No. 1, 2007).  The drafters decided to use “proportionality” because “the word 
‘retribution’ in recent years has become ideologically charged.”  Id. at 31.  For a trenchant 
critique of the revised Model Penal Code draft, see J. Michael H. Marcus, Responding to 
the Model Penal Code Sentencing Provisions: Tips for Early Adopters and Power Users, 
17 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 67 (2007). 
35 The Model Penal Code draft thus articulates the first “purpose” of the sentencing 
provisions as “to render sentences in all cases within a range of severity proportionate to 
the gravity of offenses, the harms done to crime victims, and the blameworthiness of 
offenders.”  MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(a)(i) (tentative draft No. 1, 
2007).  The draft then states that utilitarian goals, such as “offender rehabilitation” and 
“incapacitation of dangerous offenders” should be pursued “when reasonably feasible,” 
but only within the “boundaries of proportionality” previously identified.  Id. § 
1.02(2)(a)(ii). 
36 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 (1980). 
37 Marcus, supra note 34, at 72–83. 
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decades, gave judges broad discretion in sentencing and parole boards 
similar discretion in release decisions.  That model was replaced, in 
many states and in the federal courts, with “determinate” sentences.38  
Determinate sentencing schemes often included a matrix or grid that 
established a presumptive sentence based on the severity of the crime 
and the defendant’s criminal history, with a possible increase or 
decrease in the presumptive sentence based on a variety of identified 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances.39  These sentencing schemes 
received support from across the political spectrum, in part because 
they were perceived as a means to reduce disparities in sentencing 
practices among judges and prevent judges from discriminating (on 
the basis of race or other factors) in the sentencing of particular 
defendants.40  Sentencing grids and guidelines, in listing crimes by 
level of severity and setting mandatory or presumptive punishments 
based on those levels, recall the rationality and proportionality in 
criminal punishment advocated by Blackstone and Beccaria.41 
As we have seen, at its most general, the concept of proportionality 
can be used to justify approaches to punishment as old (and as blunt) 
as lex talionis and as current as the modified “just deserts” theories 
advanced by Norval Morris and included in part in the tentative draft 
of the revised sentencing provisions of the Model Penal Code.  More 
important, a concern with proportionality in sentencing is consistent 
with both retributive and utilitarian views of the purposes of 
punishment—the two principal theoretical justifications for criminal 
punishment.42  Indeed, although it is beyond this Article’s narrower 
 
38 CAMPBELL, supra note 26, at 10–26, 105–14. 
39 Id. at 123–34. 
40 Id. at 11–12.  As Campbell points out, “the articulated hopes for determinacy were 
varied and often contradictory,” with some believing that determinate sentencing would 
lead to more lenient sentences, while others thought that the result would be more severe 
sentences.  Id. at 16. 
41 Although the sentencing guidelines that emerged in the 1980s clearly were “rational” 
and “proportional” in the sense used by Blackstone and Beccaria, these characteristics 
were undermined in the 1990s by the widespread adoption of “three strikes you’re out” 
provisions requiring life imprisonment for a third conviction (for certain crimes) and 
mandatory minimum sentences for many specific offenses.  Id. at 20, 114–23.  These 
statutes often were adopted without regard for the gradations established in the existing 
sentencing guidelines. 
42 Although retributive and utilitarian justifications for punishment often are seen as 
exclusive and in conflict, forty years ago Herbert Packer persuasively argued that a 
satisfactory theory of punishment must include both elements.  PACKER, supra note 13, at 
36–45.  Packer also addressed the complex issue of proportionality between crime and 
punishment in light of these justifications for punishment.  Id. at 139–45. 
 2008] Some Thoughts on Proportionality 793 
focus on criminal sentencing, proportionality also plays a significant 
role in applying a number of noncriminal constitutional provisions, 
including the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.43 
II 
PROPORTIONALITY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT FOR 
CRIMINAL PENALTIES 
A.  Proportionality Provisions in State Constitutions 
Blackstone strongly argued for the legislature to establish penalties 
proportional to particular offenses by ranking offenses and 
corresponding punishments from the greatest to the least.  His views 
are reflected in the first state constitutions adopted after American 
independence, and many states used the occasion of adopting their 
fundamental document to specifically direct their legislatures to 
amend the criminal laws to ensure proportionality in sentencing.  The 
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, for example, included a provision 
stating that “[t]he penal laws as heretofore used, shall be reformed by 
the future legislature of this State, as soon as may be, and 
punishments made in some cases less sanguinary, and in general more 
proportionate to the crimes.”44  Similarly, South Carolina’s 
Constitution of 1778 provided that “the penal Laws, as heretofore 
used, shall be reformed, and Punishments made, in some Cases, less 
sanguinary, and, in general, more proportionate to the Crime.”45  In 
 
43 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (city may require dedication of 
part of land to public use as condition for development permit only if there is “rough 
proportionality” between city’s exaction and impact of proposed development); State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (punitive damage award 
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause because it was “neither reasonable nor 
proportionate to the wrong committed”); see generally Ristroph, supra note 6, at 292–300; 
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1054–57 
(2004); Pamela S. Karlan, “Pricking the Lines”: The Due Process Clause, Punitive 
Damages, and Criminal Punishment, 88 MINN. L. REV. 880 (2004).  Similar concerns to 
proportionality—the weighing or balancing of one interest against another and the 
limitations of government action to the minimum level necessary to accomplish the 
government's legitimate goal—also are implicated by “reasonableness” tests under the 
Fourth Amendment, speech restrictions under the First Amendment, and balancing under 
the Commerce Clause, among other constitutional provisions.  Richard S. Frase, Excessive 
Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment: “Proportionality” 
Relative to What?, 89 MINN.  L. REV. 571, 598–621 (2005). 
44 PA. CONST. of 1776, § 38.  The actions of the Pennsylvania legislature in response to 
that constitutional directive are reviewed in PESTRITTO, supra note 25, at 37–44. 
45 S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XL. 
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addition, New Hampshire’s Constitution of 1784 contained a detailed 
explanation, apparently drawn in substantial part from Blackstone, of 
the rationale for proportionality in criminal sentencing: 
 All penalties ought to be proportioned to the nature of the 
offense.  No wise Legislature will affix the same punishment to the 
crimes of theft, forgery and the like, which they do to those of 
murder and treason; where the same undistinguishing severity is 
exerted against all offences[,] the people are led to forget the real 
distinction in the crimes themselves, and to commit the most 
flagrant with as little compunction as they do those of the lightest 
dye: For the same reason a multitude of sanguinary laws is both 
impolitic and unjust.  The true design of all punishments being to 
reform, not to exterminate, mankind.46 
Subsequent revisions of these state constitutions often deleted the 
specific provisions requiring the legislature to reform the criminal 
laws and make punishment more proportional.  After statehood, 
Pennsylvania reformed its penal code in 1786 and made other changes 
to criminal statutes in 1789—abolishing the death penalty for many 
crimes and implementing hard labor, fines, and other 
punishments47—and the new Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 
eliminated the explicit reference to proportionality, leaving only a 
provision prohibiting excessive fines and “cruel punishments.”48  
South Carolina and Ohio also adopted explicit proportionality 
provisions, but later deleted them in favor of provisions similar to 
those of Pennsylvania.49 
 
46 N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, art. XVIII.  Illinois appears to have used a condensed 
version of the New Hampshire text in its 1818 and 1848 constitutions.  See ILL. CONST. of 
1818, art. VIII, § 14; ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. XIII, § 14 (“All penalties shall be 
proportioned to the nature of the offence, the true design of all punishments being to 
reform, not to exterminate, mankind.”).  The Illinois Constitution of 1870 used similar 
phrasing, but when the constitution was again revised in 1970, the word “proportioned” 
was omitted, and the provision now provides, in part, that “[a]ll penalties shall be 
determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of 
restoring the offender to useful citizenship.”  ILL. CONST. art. I, § 11.  However, the 
Illinois Supreme Court has stated that the change in wording was not intended to change 
the meaning of the provision and has continued to interpret the provision as if it explicitly 
required that penalties be “proportioned to the nature of the offense.”  People v. Sharpe, 
839 N.E.2d 492, 500 (Ill. 2005). 
47 PESTRITTO, supra note 25, at 37–38. 
48 PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 13. 
49 Compare S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XL (“penal Laws . . . shall be reformed” to make 
them “more proportionate to the Crime”), with S.C. CONST. art. IX, § 4 (“cruel and 
unusual punishment” prohibited; no reference to proportionality).  Compare OHIO CONST. 
art. 8, § 14 (1802) (proportionality clause identical to New Hampshire), with OHIO CONST. 
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Other states, however, adopted and retained specific constitutional 
provisions with respect to proportionality.  When Indiana became a 
state in 1816, Article I, section 16 of its constitution provided: “All 
penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offence.”  A 
separate section prohibited excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel 
and unusual punishment.50  When the Indiana Constitution was 
revised, the two sections were combined.51  The framers of the 
Oregon Constitution took the requirement that “all penalties shall be 
proportioned to the offense” from the Indiana Constitution.52 
As one would expect, it is difficult—and perhaps not very useful—
to generalize about the application of these provisions by state courts 
because the wording of the proportionality provisions in state 
constitutions varies.  The courts have struggled to articulate standards 
to identify when a punishment is “proportionate” or 
“disproportionate” to an offense.  Blackstone recognized that there is 
no “regular or determinate method of rating the quantity of 
punishments for crimes,”53 and courts have routinely deferred to the 
legislature’s determination of the appropriate level of punishment for 
a crime.  An Oregon case, Jensen v. Gladden,54 is illustrative.  The 
defendant was convicted of a sex crime.  Because he had a previous 
sex crime conviction, the applicable statutes provided for an 
indeterminate sentence of up to life in prison; the trial court imposed 
that sentence.  In rejecting the defendant’s argument that the sentence 
violated the proportionality provision of the Oregon Constitution, the 
Oregon Supreme Court stated: 
[W]e cannot say that there was not a reasonable basis for the 
enactment of the punishment provision [of an indeterminate life 
sentence for a second sex crime].  It is the province of the 
legislature to establish the penalties for the violation of the various 
criminal statutes and if the penalties are founded upon an arguably 
rational basis we have no authority to hold that they are invalid.55 
 
art. 1, § 9 (1851) (“cruel and unusual punishment” prohibited; no reference to 
proportionality). 
50 IND. CONST. of 1816, art. I, § 15. 
51 IND. CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 16. 
52 Id.  In addition to Oregon and Indiana, at least five other state constitutions contain 
provisions that specifically require “proportionality” in criminal punishment.  ME. CONST. 
art. I, § 9; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 15; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 18; R.I. CONST. art. 3, § 5; W. 
VA. CONST. art. 3, § 5. 
53 BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at 14–15. 
54 231 Or. 141, 372 P.2d 183 (1962). 
55 Jensen, 231 Or. at 145–46, 372 P.2d at 185. 
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Yet the Oregon courts, like other state courts construing similar 
provisions in their state constitutions, have been unwilling to leave 
the determination of proportionality entirely to the legislature.  This, 
of course, is not surprising.  Nothing in the Oregon Constitution—or 
in most of the other state constitutions with proportionality 
requirements—suggests that the clause speaks only to the legislature, 
and, like other constitutional provisions, it is susceptible to judicial 
interpretation and enforcement, even if the provision eludes easy 
application.  The Oregon cases will be examined in detail below, but, 
in general, state proportionality decisions articulate several different 
kinds of standards for determining whether a sentence is 
disproportionate to the offense.  First, a number of decisions set forth 
the somewhat vague—and perhaps necessarily so—standard that a 
sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate if it is so severe 
compared to the gravity of the offense as to “shock public sentiment 
and violate the judgment of a reasonable people.”56  The test is 
sometimes stated in terms of “gross” or “manifest” disproportionality 
and is often accompanied by the statement that the courts generally 
will defer to the legislature’s determination of the appropriate 
sentence; courts will “rarely” find a sentence that is within statutory 
limits to be disproportionate.57  Other courts have described this 
proportionality test as a variation of the “cruel and unusual” (or as 
some state constitutions phrase it, “cruel or unusual” or “cruel and 
degrading”) standard, and have attempted to determine whether the 
penalty at issue was “so wholly disproportionate to the nature of the 
offense that it shocked the moral sense of the community.”58 
Standing alone, the “shocks the conscience” test seems rather 
conclusory and subjective—and in a number of cases, state courts 
have attempted to identify objective criteria for applying that test.  
 
56 Cox v. State, 181 N.E. 469, 472 (Ind. 1932); see also Sustar v. County Court of 
Marion County, 101 Or. 657, 665, 201 P. 445, 448 (1921) (duration of sentence is 
disproportionate when it “shock[s] the moral sense of all reasonable men as to what is 
right and proper under the circumstances”); People v. Landers, 160 N.E. 836, 838 (Ill. 
1928) (sentence is disproportionate under state constitution only if it “shocks the 
conscience of reasonable men”). 
57 State v. Wheeler, 343 Or. 652, 671, 175 P.3d 438, 449 (2007) (court will hold 
sentence unconstitutional under proportionality provision “only in rare circumstances”); 
State v. Moss-Dwyer, 686 N.E.2d 109, 111–12 (Ind. 1997) (court will not find sentence 
disproportionate “except upon a showing of clear constitutional infirmity”; party 
challenging statute “labors under a heavy burden to show” unconstitutionality; court will 
not set aside legislatively determined penalty “merely because it seems too severe”). 
58 People v. Sharpe, 839 N.E.2d 492, 508 (Ill. 2005) (summarizing People v. Davis, 687 
N.E.2d 24 (Ill. 1997)). 
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The New Hampshire Supreme Court has stated that it will decide 
proportionality challenges by considering the gravity of the offense, 
the harshness of the penalty, sentences imposed on other defendants 
and for other crimes, and sentences imposed for the same crime in 
other jurisdictions.59  For many years, the Illinois courts attempted to 
determine whether particular offenses presented greater or lesser 
threats to the public than other offenses.  The courts would then 
review the respective penalties for those offenses to determine 
whether they were disproportionate because a greater penalty was 
imposed on an offense that the court had concluded was less 
serious.60  It described this technique as “cross-comparison” review 
because it permitted comparison of unrelated crimes and the penalties 
for those crimes as part of determining proportionality.  In 2005, the 
Illinois Supreme Court overruled the “cross-comparison” cases, 
concluding that the test they had used was “unworkable” and 
improperly allowed the courts “to act as a superior legislative branch, 
substituting our judgment for the legislature whenever we disagreed 
with the penalties it set.”61 
Similarly, the California Supreme Court, which has interpreted the 
state’s constitutional ban on cruel or unusual punishment to prohibit 
grossly disproportionate sentences,62 has abandoned its earlier effort 
to engage in “intercase” proportionality review—determining whether 
a penalty is disproportionate by considering penalties imposed in 
other cases.63  Although the California Supreme Court no longer 
compares the penalties for different crimes or the penalties imposed 
on different defendants that have committed the same crime, it 
continues to consider “the circumstances of the offense, including its 
motive, the extent of the defendant’s involvement in the crime, the 
 
59 State v. Dayutis, 498 A.2d 325, 329 (N.H. 1985) (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 
(1983)).  Although the New Hampshire court set out an expansive list of considerations, 
Dayutis itself was more easily resolved on “vertical proportionality” grounds, as discussed 
below. 
60 The history of the court’s effort in this regard is described in Sharpe, 839 N.E.2d at 
498. 
61 Id. at 517.  Significantly, the court retained the general test that a penalty is 
unconstitutionally disproportionate if it is “cruel and degrading” and would shock the 
moral sense of the community, as well as the “identical elements” test, under which a 
penalty for an offense is disproportionate if it is greater than the penalty for another crime 
that consists of the identical elements as the first crime.  Id.  The latter test is similar in 
most respects to the vertical proportionality test discussed below. 
62 In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921, 930 (Cal. 1972). 
63 People v. Leonard, 157 P.3d 973, 1014 (Cal. 2007). 
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manner in which the crime was committed, and the consequences of 
the defendant’s acts,” as well as the personal characteristics of the 
defendant.64 
A more specific variation of the comparison of one crime to 
another for proportionality purposes examines whether the legislature 
has classified a particular crime as less serious than a related crime—
for example, negligent homicide or manslaughter compared to first 
degree murder—and yet has provided a greater penalty for the lesser 
crime.  In Oregon, this test has been described as “vertical” 
proportionality because it compares the penalties for crimes that the 
legislature has “ranked” as to seriousness, often because one is a 
lesser-included offense of another crime.65  Vertical 
disproportionality is not as much a different test as it is a specific 
application of the more general “shocks the conscience” test 
described above.  Under the test, a court may conclude that it is 
irrational for the legislature to create, or that it would “shock the 
conscience” for the court to permit, a greater penalty for attempted 
murder than for murder. 
Vertical disproportionality—although it has been discussed only in 
a small number of cases—is more easily applied and less 
controversial than the formulations discussed above because it avoids 
the court’s involvement in a more open-ended and subjective inquiry 
regarding the relationship between a crime and its penalty or the 
relative seriousness of unrelated crimes.  It is easy for a court to look 
at the applicable statutes and conclude that negligent homicide 
involving an automobile is a lesser-included offense of manslaughter 
involving an automobile and that proportionality prohibits the 
legislature from imposing a greater punishment for the lesser offense.  
In contrast, it is difficult for a court to determine whether identity 
theft is a “more serious” offense than third degree assault and 
therefore may be punished more severely. 
State courts have used vertical proportionality—although not 
necessarily with that label—to hold certain sentences invalid because 
they were disproportionate to the offense.  The New Hampshire 
Supreme Court used this reasoning when it overturned a sentence of 
life imprisonment with a minimum term of thirty-five years for a man 
 
64 Id. at 1014 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
65 State v. Wheeler, 343 Or. 652, 675–76, 175 P.3d 438, 451–52 (2007) (describing 
“vertical” disproportionality). 
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convicted of second degree murder.66  At the time of the murder, a 
defendant convicted of first degree murder would have faced a 
maximum sentence of life imprisonment with an eighteen-year 
minimum.  The court concluded that the imposition of a more severe 
penalty for a lesser crime violated the proportionality provision of the 
New Hampshire Constitution, as well as the Eighth Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution.  Similarly, the Oregon Supreme Court held that 
a sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate when a defendant 
convicted of intentional murder received a longer minimum sentence 
than he would have received if he had been convicted of aggravated 
murder.67 
B.  Federal Proportionality 
In contrast to the early state constitutions described above, neither 
the original federal Constitution nor the Bill of Rights contained an 
explicit proportionality requirement for criminal punishment.  
Pestritto argues that the leading thinkers of the constitutional period—
including Jefferson, Wilson, Madison, and Hamilton—favored 
proportionality in criminal sentencing for moral (retributive) and 
practical (utilitarian) reasons.68  The only specific limitation on the 
scope of criminal punishment in the federal Constitution, however, is 
the Eighth Amendment.  Adopted in 1791 and drawn from the 
English Bill of Rights (by way of the Virginia Declaration of Rights 
and the federal Northwest Ordinance of 1787), the amendment 
prohibits “excessive fines” and “cruel and unusual punishments.”69 
Whether the explicit prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment 
contains an implicit ban on disproportionate punishments has divided 
scholars and the U.S. Supreme Court for many years.  Anthony 
Granucci argues that the framers did not view the English prohibition 
on cruel and unusual punishment, which was the basis for the Eighth 
 
66 State v. Dayutis, 498 A.2d 325, 328 (N.H. 1985). 
67 State v. Shumway, 291 Or. 153, 164, 630 P.2d 796, 802 (1981). 
68 PESTRITTO, supra note 25, at 124–36.  Pestritto seems to be at pains to refute the idea 
that the framers agreed with Beccaria’s utilitarian, nonmorals based approach to criminal 
punishment.  Certainly, he is correct that almost all of the framers, even Jefferson, viewed 
criminal punishment as including an important moral component.  As Pestritto’s own 
research demonstrates, however, antinatural law thinkers like Becarria and Hobbes also 
had an important influence on the framers, even when their ideas were not accepted in 
toto. 
69 On the origins of the Eighth Amendment, see Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 839–44 
(1969). 
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Amendment, as also prohibiting excessive or disproportionate 
sentences—but that they were incorrect in interpreting the English 
rule that way.70  His reading of the English history suggests that the 
provision in the English Bill of Rights on which the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause was based was intended to prohibit 
“excessive punishments in any form.”71  He argues that the word 
“cruel” was a synonym for “severe” or “excessive” and that the 
prohibition thus extended to “disproportionate penalties” of any 
kind.72  The prohibition, of course, did not prohibit capital 
punishment or even many forms of corporal punishment, but rather 
barred forms of torture that were illegal or at least not customary and 
all punishments that were excessive compared to the seriousness of 
the crime.73 
The Court was divided in its first decision addressing whether the 
Eighth Amendment contained a proportionality component, Weems v. 
United States.74  Confronted with the argument that a sentence of 
fifteen years at hard labor was a cruel and unusual punishment for 
making a false entry in a government payroll book, the Court held 
that “it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be 
graduated and proportioned to offense.”75  Comparing the crime with 
the penalty, the Court held that the sentence was disproportionate and 
thus constituted cruel and unusual punishment.  Justice White, joined 
by Justice Holmes, dissented.  Looking to the history of the Eighth 
Amendment, the dissent concluded that the amendment was 
principally meant as a prohibition against “barbarous modes of bodily 
punishment or torture.”76  The dissent acknowledged that judges 
cannot use their discretion to “select and exert . . . usual modes of 
 
70 Id. at 860–65. 
71 Id. at 847. 
72 Id. at 860. 
73 Id. at 842; see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966–75 (1991) (describing 
historical background and noting focus of “cruel and unusual punishment” prohibition on 
illegal sentences and cruel methods of punishment).  One recent article argues that, 
whether or not the Eighth Amendment was intended to bar disproportionate punishments, 
its application today, when incarceration is the primary form of criminal punishment, 
requires that it be read to include a proportionality element.  Note, The Eighth Amendment, 
Proportionality, and the Changing Meaning of Punishment, 122 HARV. L. REV. 960 
(2009). 
74 217 U.S. 349, 371 (1910). 
75 Id. at 367. 
76 Id. at 397 (White, J., dissenting). 
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punishment to a degree not usual,”77 but maintained that the 
amendment did not similarly confine the legislature.  Instead, the only 
limit imposed on the legislature was the prohibition on “the infliction 
of bodily punishments of a cruel and barbarous character against 
which the Amendment expressly provided.”78 
Since Weems, the Court has developed two lines of reasoning 
regarding proportionality within the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause.  In death penalty cases, the Court has looked to “history” and 
“the objective evidence of the country’s present judgment” 
concerning death as a penalty for any given crime.79  For example, 
the Court has surveyed state law to determine how many states 
authorize the death penalty for certain crimes and examined whether 
juries enforce those laws that authorize it.80  The Court has 
acknowledged, however, that ultimately its “own judgment will be 
brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death 
penalty” for any given crime.81  In so doing, the Court has compared 
the severity of the crime, including the offender’s mens rea, with the 
penalty of death, which “is unique in its severity and irrevocability,”82 
to reject death as a penalty for rape,83 child rape,84 some types of 
felony murder,85 and for defendants who are not mentally capable86 
or are minors.87 
In noncapital cases, the Court’s efforts to apply the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause have not been as straightforward.  It was 
more than sixty years after Weems that the Court, in Rummel v. 
Estelle, again addressed proportionality—albeit cryptically—in a 
 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 398. 
79 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593 (1977).  Coker was a plurality opinion; Justice 
Brennan and Justice Marshall concurred, concluding that the death penalty is always cruel 
and unusual punishment.  Id. at 600. 
80 E.g., id. at 593–97; Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789–97 (1982). 
81 Coker, 433 U.S. at 597. 
82 Id. at 598 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976)). 
83 Id. at 592. 
84 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008). 
85 Compare Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801 (no death penalty when defendant did not kill or 
intend to kill), with Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (death penalty allowed 
when defendants did not kill, but were actively and substantially involved in events 
leading to murder, and acted with reckless indifference to human life). 
86 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 310, 320–21 (2002). 
87 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005). 
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noncapital case.88  The defendant in Rummel was sentenced under a 
habitual offender statute to life imprisonment (with the possibility of 
parole) for obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses;89 his two prior 
crimes were fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80 worth of 
goods or services and passing a forged check for $28.36.90 
The Court distinguished Rummel and other cases concerning 
ordinary felony prison sentences from Weems, noting that the 
“accessories” accompanying the punishment (including “hard and 
painful labor”) put Weems more on par with the death penalty cases 
than noncapital cases.91  Instead of simply abandoning the 
proportionality analysis in ordinary noncapital cases, however, the 
Court stated only that “one could argue without fear of contradiction 
by any decision of this Court that for crimes concededly classified 
and classifiable as felonies, . . . the length of the sentence actually 
imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative.”92  The Court 
acknowledged only that, in certain “extreme” cases, a proportionality 
principle would come into play.93  As an example of such an extreme 
case, the Court gave a legislature’s decision to make overtime parking 
a felony punishable by life imprisonment.94  But the Court held that 
life imprisonment for the three crimes at issue in Rummel was not 
such an extreme case.95  Four Justices dissented in an opinion by 
Justice Powell.96 
Just three years later, in Solem v. Helm, the Court reached nearly 
the opposite conclusion, holding unconstitutional a mandatory 
sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 
passing a bad check for $100, a punishment required by South 
Dakota’s recidivist sentencing scheme.97  The five Justices in the 
majority expressly adopted the “deeply rooted”98 concept of 
proportionality in ordinary noncapital cases finding “no basis for the 
State’s assertion that the general principle of proportionality does not 
 
88 445 U.S. 263 (1980). 
89 Id. at 265–66. 
90 Id. at 265. 
91 Id. at 273–74. 
92 Id. at 274 (emphasis added). 
93 Id. at 274 n.11. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 275 (deferring to the Texas legislature). 
96 Id. at 285 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
97 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983). 
98 Id. at 284. 
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apply to felony prison sentences.”99  The Court used a three-factor 
test first set forth by the dissent in Rummel to determine 
disproportionality.  It looked to the “objective criteria” of (1) the 
gravity of the offense and the severity of the penalty; (2) the sentences 
imposed for other crimes in the same jurisdiction; and (3) the 
sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.100  The 
Court noted that the defendant’s current crime, along with his prior 
offenses—theft crimes and driving while intoxicated—“were all 
relatively minor” and that life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole was more severe than the life sentences considered in Rummel, 
which provided for the possibility of parole in twelve years.101  The 
Court also determined that the defendant was treated more harshly 
than others convicted of “far more serious crimes,” and received a 
greater sentence than he would have in any other state.102  Based on 
these factors, the Court concluded that the defendant’s life sentence 
was cruel and unusual.103 
In the decades following Solem, the Court has continued to struggle 
to find agreement on the test for determining proportionality.  The 
next major case, Harmelin v. Michigan, failed to produce a majority 
opinion.104  In that case, the Court upheld a life sentence without the 
possibility of parole for possession of more than 650 grams of 
cocaine, but based that result on two different rationales.  Two 
Justices would have abandoned proportionality altogether in 
noncapital cases;105 three—Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, and 
Souter—adopted a modified version of the three-factor Solem test.106  
Writing for the three-member concurrence, Justice Kennedy applied 
 
99 Id. at 288. 
100 Id. at 292.  The Court (in an opinion by Justice Powell, who wrote the dissenting 
opinion in Rummel) took pains to distinguish Rummel and asserted that Rummel had not 
abandoned proportionality in noncapital cases.  However, as discussed, Solem does stray 
quite far from Rummel and in fact adopts the reasoning of Justice Powell’s dissent in that 
case.  Id. at 290–303. 
101 Id. at 296–97. 
102 Id. at 299–300. 
103 Id. at 303. 
104 501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
105 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Rehnquist, announced the judgment of the Court, 
but the two Justices were alone in the view that the Eighth Amendment provides no 
proportionality principle for noncapital cases.  Id. at 961–94. 
106 Id. at 996–1009 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Although the concurrence claimed it was 
simply applying Solem, the dissent disagreed: “While Justice Scalia seeks to deliver a 
swift death sentence to Solem, Justice Kennedy prefers to eviscerate it, leaving only an 
empty shell.”  Id. at 1018 (White, J., dissenting). 
 804 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87, 783 
only the first factor (comparing the offense with the penalty), stating 
that consideration of the other factors (intra- and interjurisdictional 
comparison) is “appropriate only in the rare case in which a threshold 
comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to 
an inference of gross disproportionality.”107  This, the concurrence 
maintained, was not such a “rare case.”  The four dissenting Justices 
would have adhered to the Solem framework and overturned the 
sentence.108 
The Court’s struggle to reach a consensus—or even a stable 
majority—highlights the difficulty of attempting to establish an 
objective test for determining proportionality.  States with their own 
proportionality clauses, like Oregon, are able to avoid the threshold 
issue the Court has faced—whether the Eighth Amendment contains a 
proportionality component at all.  But once this threshold is crossed, 
the search for standards of proportionality in the Eighth Amendment 
is equally difficult.  Not surprisingly, the Court’s cases foreshadow 
the two main tests that state courts have articulated.  Justice 
Kennedy’s general “gross disproportionality” threshold represents the 
subjective but deferential “shocks the conscience” test.  By contrast, 
Justice Powell’s three-factor “objective” test from Solem is an effort 
to establish a more broadly based standard that allows for changing 
values to emerge, but also reminds us of the difficulty of applying the 
test and gaining consensus on its application in a particular case. 
III 
OREGON’S PROPORTIONALITY REQUIREMENT 
Oregon adopted an explicit proportionality requirement as part of 
article I, section 16 of the original 1857 constitution.  But it was not 
until 1921, in Sustar v. County Court of Marion County, that the 
Oregon Supreme Court first addressed proportionality explicitly.109  
 
107 Id. at 1005.  The Court was similarly split in Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 
(2003). 
108 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1009 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 1027 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (concurring in Justice White’s opinion “except insofar as it asserts that the 
Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not proscribe the death 
penalty”). 
109 101 Or. 657, 201 P. 445 (1921).  In State v. Ross, the Oregon Supreme Court held 
that a criminal sentence was so excessive as to be cruel and unusual punishment. 55 Or. 
450, 474, 104 P. 596, 604–05 (1910), modified on reh’g, 55 Or. 450, 106 P. 1022 (1910), 
appeal dismissed, 227 U.S. 150 (1913).  With essentially no analysis of the relevant 
constitutional provisions, the court overturned a sentence that required the defendant, 
convicted of larceny, to pay a fine of $576,953.74, to serve five years in the penitentiary, 
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The defendant in Sustar was convicted of possessing two quarts of 
“moonshine” and sentenced to six months in jail and fined $500.  He 
challenged his sentence as disproportionate to the offense.  Although 
the court opined that the trial judge “went to the verge by inflicting 
the extreme penalty,” it held that the “sentence was within the 
law.”110  As to the defendant’s proportionality challenge, the court 
quoted the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Weems that “[i]t is a 
precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and 
proportioned to the offense.”111  The Oregon court then set forth the 
test that it would apply to determine whether a punishment was so 
graduated and proportioned: “In order to justify the court in declaring 
punishment cruel and unusual with reference to its duration, the 
punishment must be so proportioned to the offense committed as to 
shock the moral sense of all reasonable men as to what is right and 
proper under the circumstances.”112 
Several aspects of Sustar are worth noting.  First, although the 
Oregon court cited Weems for its “shock the moral sense” test, these 
words appear nowhere in Weems.  Weems does include a discussion 
of the framers’ intent to establish a government of limited powers and 
a constitution that would not permit government practices “which 
would shock the sensibilities of men.”113  Presumably, the court 
relied upon the “shock the sensibilities” wording in Weems’s 
discussion of the historical origins of the Eighth Amendment, but the 
Court itself did not articulate that specific test as the standard for 
applying the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.  Nevertheless, 
the Oregon court was not inaccurate in using the phrase “shock the 
moral sense” as shorthand for the U.S. Supreme Court’s standard, and 
other state courts have similarly read Weems as establishing a “shocks 
the conscience” or “shocks the moral sense” standard for applying the 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.114 
 
and to spend one day in the county jail for every $2 of the fine, not to exceed 288,426 
days.  Ross, 55 Or. at 457, 104 P. at 599. 
110 Sustar, 101 Or. at 662, 201 P. at 447. 
111 Sustar, 101 Or. at 665, 201 P. at 448 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 
367 (1910)). 
112 Sustar, 101 Or. at 665, 201 P. at 448 (citing Weems, 217 U.S. at 367). 
113 Weems, 217 U.S. at 375; see also id. at 381 (contrasting unrestrained power and 
constitutionally limited power). 
114 State v. Freeman, 574 P.2d 950, 954–55 (Kan. 1978) (prohibition of cruel and 
unusual punishment includes “terms of sentences which are so out of proportion to the 
nature of the crime that they shock the general conscience in light of concepts of elemental 
decency”); Weber v. Commonwealth, 196 S.W.2d 465, 469 (Ky. 1946) (punishment is 
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Second, the court in Sustar did not distinguish between the cruel 
and unusual punishment provision and the proportionality provision 
in article I, section 16.115  Indeed, by relying on Weems’s 
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment for its interpretation of article 
I, section 16, the court seems to have either ignored the separate 
Oregon constitutional requirement of proportionality or concluded 
that that provision added no substantive limitation on criminal 
punishment that was not also included in the ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment.116 
Since Sustar, the Oregon Supreme Court has continued to use the 
“shock the moral sense” standard to determine whether a criminal 
sentence meets the proportionality requirement.117  The court has, 
however, refined that general test.  In several cases, the court has 
examined statutes imposing enhanced penalties on repeat offenders 
and has upheld them against constitutional challenge “even if those 
sentences would be disproportionate when applied to a defendant 
 
cruel and unusual with respect to duration if it “shocks the moral sense of all reasonable 
men as to what is right and proper under the circumstances”). 
115 The defendant in Sustar specifically relied on the proportionality provision of article 
I, section 16, and cited authorities holding that the Eighth Amendment and general 
principles of American law barred clearly excessive punishments.  The state argued that 
the punishment was “not disproportionate to the crime charged to such an extent that it 
shocked the conscience or moral sense,” and that it was not cruel and unusual.  It relied 
upon Weems and a number of state decisions upholding similar penalties for liquor 
possession.  See 548 Oregon Briefs, Tab 8 (1921). 
116 See State v. Rodriguez, 217 Or. App. 351, 357 n.2, 174 P.3d 1100, 1103 n.2 (2007), 
review allowed, 344 Or. 539, 186 P.3d 285 (2008) (discussing the lack of distinction 
between proportionality and cruel and unusual punishment in Oregon case law).  Other 
state courts have similarly melded their own proportionality provisions with the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment.  People v. Sharpe, 839 N.E.2d 
492, 514 (Ill. 2005) (“[T]he proportionate penalties clause was clearly intended by the 
framers to be synonymous with the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution’s 
cruel and unusual punishment clause.”); State v. Dayutis, 498 A.2d 325, 328–29 (N.H. 
1985) (recognizing that the state constitutional provision was separate but concluding that 
the state provision “provides at least as much protection of individual rights as that 
established in Solem v. Helm” and analyzing under Solem). 
117 See State v. Wheeler, 343 Or. 652, 676–79, 175 P.3d 438, 452–53 (2007); State v. 
Rogers, 313 Or. 356, 380, 836 P.2d 1308, 1323 (1992); State v. Teague, 215 Or. 609, 611, 
336 P.2d 338, 339–40 (1959).  The court also has clarified—assuming any clarification 
was necessary—that the reference in Sustar to the “moral sense of all reasonable people” 
was not intended to refer literally to “all” people, but rather to articulate a standard “that 
would find a penalty to be disproportionately severe for a particular offense only in rare 
circumstances.”  Wheeler, 343 Or. at 671, 175 P.3d at 449. 
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without prior convictions.”118  The court also, on occasion, has 
articulated a somewhat different test from the “shocks the moral 
sense” standard, but one that gives a similar degree of deference to 
legislative choice as to criminal penalties.  As noted earlier, in Jensen 
v. Gladden the court stated that “if the penalties are founded upon an 
arguably rational basis we have no authority to hold that they are 
invalid” under the proportionality provision.119  In State v. Wheeler, 
the court rejected the idea that the “rational basis” test and the “moral 
shock” test were different in substance, observing that the rational 
basis cases also cited the moral shock test and asserting that the court 
in those cases had “looked to the legislative enactment of the 
particular penalties at issue as an external source of law to assist in 
determining whether those penalties would shock the moral sense of 
reasonable people.”120 
In addition to the general “shock the moral sense” and “rational 
basis” tests for proportionality, Oregon has also used a “vertical” 
proportionality standard, discussed above, to hold invalid a sentence 
imposed for committing a lesser degree of the same crime (or a lesser-
included offense) that exceeded the permissible sentence for 
committing the greater degree of the crime (or the greater-included 
offense).  The Oregon Supreme Court first confronted this issue in 
Cannon v. Gladden.121  The defendant was charged with rape, but 
convicted of the lesser-included offense of assault with intent to 
commit rape.  Rape carried a maximum penalty of twenty years, 
while assault with intent to commit raped carried a maximum penalty 
of life in prison.  The defendant challenged his life sentence on 
proportionality grounds.  The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, asking 
and then answering a rhetorical question: 
 How can it be said that life imprisonment for an assault with 
intent to commit rape is proportionate to the offense when the 
greater crime of rape authorizes a sentence of not more than 20 
years?  It is unthinkable, and shocking to the moral sense of all 
reasonable men as to what is right and proper, that in this 
enlightened age jurisprudence would countenance a situation where 
an offender, either on a plea or verdict of guilty to the charge of 
 
118 Wheeler, 343 Or. at 677, 175 P.3d at 452; see also Jensen v. Gladden, 231 Or. 141, 
372 P.2d 183 (1962) (upholding, against proportionality challenges, enhanced penalties for 
repeat offenders); State v. Smith, 128 Or. 515, 273 P. 323 (1929) (same). 
119 231 Or. at 146, 372 P.2d at 185; see also State v. Isom, 313 Or. 391, 400, 837 P.2d 
491, 497 (1992) (applying rational basis test). 
120 343 Or. at 671, 175 P.3d at 449. 
121 203 Or. 629, 281 P.2d 233 (1955). 
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rape, could be sentenced to the penitentiary for a period of not more 
than 20 years, whereas if he were found guilty of the lesser offense 
of assault with intent to commit rape he could spend the rest of his 
days in the bastile [sic].122 
The court followed Cannon in State v. Shumway, where the 
defendant was convicted of intentional homicide and sentenced to life 
in prison, with a minimum of twenty-five years before being eligible 
for parole.  He challenged his sentence as disproportionate to the 
offense because if he had committed aggravated intentional 
homicide, he could have received a life sentence with eligibility for 
parole in fifteen or twenty years, depending on the nature of the 
aggravating circumstances.123  The court held that that disparity 
rendered the twenty-five-year minimum unconstitutional, but 
otherwise upheld his indeterminate life sentence. 
Cannon and Shumway indicate that Oregon, like some other states, 
has occasionally used “vertical” proportionality to find sentences (and 
statutes authorizing those sentences) unconstitutional.124  In vertical 
proportionality cases, the court’s inquiry is more focused and less 
open-ended because the court can look to the legislature’s own 
determination of which crimes it considers to be less serious or more 
serious—which crimes, for example, are lesser-included offenses of 
other crimes because they require proof of only certain elements of 
the greater crime.  The court can then compare the penalties that the 
legislature has set for those crimes to see whether the greater crime 
leads to the greater penalty and therefore is “proportional.” 
Vertical proportionality is not as easy to apply as it first appears.  It 
requires, for example, a careful reading of the elements of the statutes 
defining the relevant crimes.  In some circumstances—such as 
delivery of a controlled substance125 and robbery126—the legislature 
has set the same penalty for the “attempt” crime as for the completed 
crime, usually by defining the substantive crime to include an attempt 
to commit the crime.  In Wheeler, the court stated that those penalties 
do not violate the proportionality requirement because the penalty for 
 
122 Cannon, 203 Or. at 632–33, 281 P.2d at 235. 
123 State v. Shumway, 291 Or. 153, 164, 630 P.2d 796, 802 (1981); see also State v. 
McLain, 158 Or. App. 419, 974 P.2d 727 (1999) (applying Shumway to hold 
unconstitutional life sentence for murder when sentence for greater offense of aggravated 
murder allowed possibility of parole after twenty-five years). 
124 343 Or. at 677 n.11, 175 P.3d at 452 n.11. 
125 OR. REV. STAT. § 475.005(8) (2008). 
126 OR. REV. STAT. § 164.395 (2008). 
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the attempted crime is the same as, but not greater than, that for the 
completed crime. 
Moreover, the seemingly straightforward facial analysis in 
Cannon—assault with intent to commit rape is a lesser-included 
offense of the crime of rape; therefore, imposing a greater penalty for 
the former crime than for the latter is disproportionate—may break 
down when considering specific cases.  The court in Cannon 
observed that the penalty for statutory rape (as well as for forcible 
rape) was twenty years in prison.  One can easily imagine why the 
legislature might impose a greater penalty for a brutal assault with 
intent to commit a forcible rape than for a nonforcible, statutory rape.  
And it is difficult to see why that greater sentence should be 
unconstitutionally disproportionate.127  For that reason, the court’s 
rationale in Cannon seems inadequate, or at least incomplete, while 
the result in the case seems right on its facts. 
But vertical proportionality, notwithstanding the nuances just 
discussed, at least relies on legislative determinations as to the 
severity of particular, related crimes.  It is more difficult to articulate 
meaningful standards for comparing the severity of different crimes 
that are unrelated—such as assault and theft—or to determine 
whether the penalty for a crime, standing alone, is “disproportionate” 
to the crime.  Indeed, the only Oregon cases holding penalties to be 
unconstitutionally disproportionate are the vertical proportionality 
cases, Cannon and Shumway.128 
The difficulty of establishing objective standards for determining 
proportionality outside the vertical proportionality context is 
presumably what led Oregon, like many other states, to use more 
general tests such as “shocks the moral sense” or “shocks the 
conscience.”  These tests recognize the court’s authority to declare a 
sentence or a statute permitting a sentence unconstitutional in extreme 
cases, but give substantial deference to the legislature’s determination 
 
127 The unusual circumstances in Cannon help make the point.  The defendant was 
charged with statutory rape, but the jury found him guilty of the lesser-included offense of 
assault with intent to commit rape; he received the more severe penalty.  While the 
rationale of the court’s proportionality clause analysis would have made sense if the 
defendant had been charged with forcible rape, it is less persuasive given the reported facts 
of the case—and, as noted, the result is sound enough. 
128 State v. Ross, discussed supra note 109, overturned a sentence as cruel and unusual 
because the court considered it excessive.  However, the court did not discuss 
proportionality, indicate whether it was relying on the Oregon or federal constitution, or 
analyze the meaning of the constitutional provision.  55 Or. 450, 104 P. 596, on reh’g, 55 
Or. 450, 106 P. 1022 (1910), appeal dismissed, 227 U.S. 150 (1913). 
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of the severity level of the crime—and thus whether the penalty for 
that crime is proportional. 
The legislature’s primary role in determining the seriousness of a 
crime was addressed in State v. Ferman-Velasco.129  The defendant 
challenged a sentence imposed under a voter-passed mandatory 
sentencing law because the sentence was more severe than the 
existing sentences for equal or more serious crimes unchanged by the 
new law.  The court rejected that argument, reasoning that the law 
setting the new and greater penalties for certain crimes demonstrated 
that those crimes were more serious than the comparator crimes.  The 
new law, the court said, “represents the most recent legislative 
enactment demonstrating the seriousness with which the legislative 
branch views [the crimes identified in that law], including defendant’s 
crimes.”130 
Ferman-Velasco emphasizes once again the primary role of the 
legislature in determining which crimes are more serious by setting 
more severe penalties for those crimes.  But the case does not mean 
that the Oregon courts have no role in ensuring, as article I, section 16 
requires, that “all penalties . . . be proportioned to the offense.”  
Indeed, the Oregon courts consistently have been willing to consider 
proportionality challenges to sentences, although they usually have 
found the sentences constitutional.  Most recently in State v. Wheeler, 
the court upheld life sentences without the possibility of parole for 
each of eighteen sex convictions when the defendant had two 
previous felony sex convictions.131 
The lingering question for Oregon courts, and those of other states, 
is whether any more useful standard than “shocks the conscience” 
exists for determining proportionality, outside the context of vertical 
proportionality.  In many ways, the struggles of state courts to 
interpret proportionality provisions have mirrored the mixed results of 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s efforts, described above, to determine when 
long prison terms for minor crimes may be held unconstitutional as 
cruel and unusual punishment.  A court, with some confidence, may 
be able to say that life imprisonment for a parking offense is an 
excessive punishment that is disproportionate to the crime or 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.132  Although not as 
 
129 333 Or. 422, 41 P.3d 404 (2002). 
130 Ferman-Velasco, 333 Or. at 431, 41 P.3d at 409. 
131 State v. Wheeler, 343 Or. 652, 676–80, 175 P.3d 438, 452–54 (2007). 
132 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 n.11 (1980). 
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extreme as the example offered by the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
Illinois Supreme Court had little trouble holding unconstitutionally 
disproportionate a mandatory three- to seven-year prison term for 
altering by six months the expiration date on a temporary registration 
permit for one’s own car.133  But agreement on the standards that 
should be applied rapidly breaks down as one considers more serious 
crimes. 
A number of state courts have examined factors similar to those 
that the U.S. Supreme Court identified in Solem—the gravity of the 
offense and severity of the punishment; the sentences imposed for 
other crimes in the same jurisdiction; and the sentences imposed for 
the same crime in other jurisdictions.134  Two states—Illinois and 
California—now appear to have abandoned the second Solem factor 
and no longer attempt to compare sentences imposed for unrelated 
crimes as part of deciding proportionality challenges.135  Both states 
continue to use a version of the “shock the conscience” test, and 
California examines a variety of factors concerning the defendant and 
the circumstances of the crime to determine whether the sentence is 
disproportionate.136 
To date, the most elaborate effort in the Oregon appellate courts to 
apply the proportionality standards of article I, section 16 in a close 
case are the opinions by four different judges of the Oregon Court of 
Appeals, sitting en banc, in State v. Thorp.  In that case, a sixteen-
 
133 People v. Morris, 554 N.E.2d 235 (Ill. 1990). 
134 See In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921 (Cal. 1972); People v. Davis, 687 N.E.2d 24 (Ill. 
1997); State v. Dayutis, 498 A.2d 325 (N.H. 1985); State v. Thorp, 166 Or. App. 564, 
576–80, 2 P.3d 903, 909–11 (majority opinion) (comparing penalties for the same crime in 
other states but refusing to compare the penalty at issue with penalties for other crimes in 
Oregon), 916 (Haselton, J., dissenting) (2000), review dismissed, 34 P.3d 1177 (2001); see 
also State v. Rodriguez, 217 Or. App. 351, 174 P.3d 1100 (2007), review allowed, 344 Or. 
539, 186 P.3d 285 (2008) (stating that the Solem test “can provide useful, objective 
guidance” but determining that applying it was unnecessary because the penalty at issue 
would not “shock the moral sense” of all reasonable people). 
135 See People v. Sharpe, 839 N.E.2d 492 (Ill. 2005); People v. Leonard, 157 P.3d 973 
(Cal. 2007). 
136 See supra text accompanying note 64.  One relevant factor in this analysis is the 
defendant's criminal history.  Blackstone argued that death and other harsh penalties 
“ought never to be inflicted, but when the offender appears incorrigible: which may be 
collected either from a repetition of minuter offences; or from the perpetration of some one 
crime of deep malignity, which of itself demonstrates a disposition without hope or 
probability of amendment.”  BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at 12 (emphasis in original); see 
State v. Wheeler, 343 Or. 652, 676, 175 P.3d 438, 452 (2007) (a penalty that might be 
“disproportionate when applied to a defendant without prior convictions” may not be 
disproportionate when applied to repeat offender). 
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year-old defendant was given a mandatory sentence of seventy-five 
months for consensual sex with a girl who was three years and ten 
days younger than him.  Writing for the majority, Judge (now Chief 
Justice) De Muniz reviewed the Oregon proportionality cases and the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Solem, and identified three 
principles that the court viewed as “controlling” in the interpretation 
of article I, section 16: the power to establish sentences for specific 
crimes was reserved to the legislature, subject to constitutional 
limitations; proportionality challenges have rarely been successful; 
and the proportionality provision “forbids only those sentences that 
are grossly disproportionate to the crime.”137  The majority then 
examined in detail the crime of statutory rape, including its early 
history and its status since Oregon statehood, and discussed the policy 
reasons for criminalizing consensual sex in those circumstances.138  
Turning to the Sustar test, the majority stated that it could not hold the 
sentence unconstitutional unless it could “conclude that the moral 
sense of all reasonable persons is shocked by the sentence,”139 
although it rejected the state’s argument that the existence of a statute 
imposing the prescribed sentence conclusively demonstrated that the 
sentence was not disproportionate.140  The majority examined the 
characteristics of the defendant, noting that, although he had no 
history of sex crimes, he described himself as a “gangster” and had 
had many run-ins with the police.141  Rejecting the dissent’s effort to 
compare statutory rape with crimes that the dissent considered more 
serious but carried lesser penalties, the majority held that the 
legislature had the authority “to determine the relative seriousness of 
crimes” by establishing more severe penalties for crimes that they 
considered more serious, and upheld the mandatory seventy-five-
month sentence.142 
 
137 Thorp, 166 Or. App. at 572, 2 P.3d at 907 (emphasis in original). 
138 Thorp, 166 Or. App. at 572–75, 2 P.3d at 907–09. 
139 Thorp, 166 Or. App. at 577, 2 P.3d at 909 (emphasis in original). 
140 Thorp, 166 Or. App. at 578, 2 P.3d at 910. 
141 Thorp, 166 Or. App. at 578, 2 P.3d at 910. 
142 Thorp, 166 Or. App. at 577, 2 P.3d at 911.  The Oregon Supreme Court first allowed 
review of Thorp, but later granted the state’s motion to dismiss the petition for review.  
332 Or. 559, 34 P.3d 1177 (2001).  Although the order dismissing review did not state the 
court’s reason(s) for deciding not to review the case, the state’s motion pointed out that 
after the Oregon Court of Appeals decision, the legislature had amended the statute under 
which Thorp was sentenced.  As amended, the sentencing statute, ORS 137.712(2)(e), 
permits the court to make a downward departure from the otherwise mandatory seventy-
five-month sentence that Thorp received.  The departure sentence is permitted only in 
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Judge Edmonds concurred, stating that he considered the sentence 
to be “unjust,” but he could not say that it “shock[ed] the conscience 
of all reasonable people,” because when article I, section 16 was 
adopted, a defendant convicted of statutory rape could have been 
sentenced to between three and twenty years in prison.143  Judge 
Brewer also filed a separate concurring opinion in which Judge 
Landau joined.  In Judge Brewer’s view, the case involved a claim 
that the sentence was unconstitutional because it was cruel and 
unusual, not because it was disproportionate.144  He stated that it 
seemed probable that “most” people would consider a seventy-five-
month sentence unreasonable on the facts of the case, but that even 
that “objective probability” involved a subjective component.145  He 
rejected use of the Solem test because, although the test might be 
useful, it had substantial analytical flaws.  He asserted that the first 
component—comparing the gravity of the offense and the harshness 
of the penalty—“is somewhat tautological.”146  Further, he stated that 
the second and third parts of the test—examining sentences for other 
crimes in the same jurisdiction and for the same crime in other 
jurisdictions—improperly limited the legislature’s authority to change 
its assessment of which crimes are more serious and the penalties 
imposed for those crimes.147  Like the majority, Judge Brewer 
focused on the defendant’s manipulative conduct and eventually 
concluded that because there was “an arguably rational basis” for 
applying the mandatory sentence to the particular defendant, he was 
unable to “confidently proclaim” that the “moral sense of all 
reasonable people would be shocked” by the sentence.148 
Judge Haselton, joined by three other members of the court, 
dissented.149  He generally adhered to the Solem test, focusing first on 
the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty.  In doing 
 
certain narrow circumstances that closely track the facts in Thorp, including the ages of the 
victim and defendant, the consensual nature of the conduct, and the absence of prior 
convictions.  Although the amended statute was not retroactive and did not apply to Thorp, 
the state asserted that the case was no longer review-worthy; in any subsequent case 
involving similar facts, the court would be authorized to depart from the mandatory 
sentence and impose any lesser sentence permitted under the sentencing guidelines. 
143 Thorp, 166 Or. App. at 581, 2 P.3d at 911–12 (Edmonds, J., concurring). 
144 Thorp, 166 Or. App. at 581–86, 2 P.3d at 912–15 (Brewer, J., concurring). 
145 Thorp, 166 Or. App. at 582, 2 P.3d at 912 (Brewer, J., concurring). 
146 Thorp, 166 Or. App. at 583, 2 P.3d at 913 (Brewer, J., concurring). 
147 Thorp, 166 Or. App. at 583, 2 P.3d at 913 (Brewer, J., concurring). 
148 Thorp, 166 Or. App. at 586, 2 P.3d at 914 (Brewer, J., concurring). 
149 Thorp, 166 Or. App. at 587, 2 P.3d at 915 (Haselton, J., dissenting). 
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so, he emphasized the importance of evaluating the “specific facts 
surrounding the particular defendant’s offense, in addition to the 
nature of the crime in a more generic sense.”150  To that end, he 
discussed in detail the relationship between the defendant and the 
victim and the personal characteristics of each, as well as the penalties 
historically imposed in Oregon for statutory rape.  As to the second 
Solem factor, Judge Haselton compared the sentences imposed in 
Oregon for robbery, assault, and sex crimes other than statutory rape.  
He pointed out that the defendant would have received a lesser 
punishment if, instead of having consensual sex with the girl, “he had 
compelled her to engage in prostitution, used her in creating child 
pornography, or sexually abused her corpse.”151  In his view, the 
disproportionality of the statutory rape sentence was “manifest.”152  
Finally, examining the third Solem factor, Judge Haselton reviewed 
the penalties for statutory rape in other jurisdictions.  Although he 
acknowledged that some other states had mandatory prison sentences 
for that crime and in some states the defendant also could have been 
tried as an adult (as was the defendant in Thorp), in no other state 
would the defendant automatically have been tried as an adult and 
also been subject to such a lengthy mandatory sentence, with no 
discretion on the part of the trial court to consider the circumstances 
of the parties or the offense.153  He concluded that the sentence was 
unconstitutional because it violated the proportionality requirement of 
article I, section 16.154 
Decisions since Thorp have altered some of the legal conclusions 
that the Oregon Court of Appeals reached.  In Wheeler, the Oregon 
Supreme Court treated earlier cases focusing on allegedly excessive 
sentences as cases arising under the proportionality clause of article I, 
section 16, rather than solely under the cruel and unusual punishment 
provision, contrary to some of the suggestions in Judge Brewer’s 
concurring opinion.155  The Wheeler court also held that the Sustar 
“shock the moral sense of all reasonable people” test should not be 
taken literally—“that is, that a penalty for a particular crime would 
meet the proportionality requirement if a single ‘reasonable person’ 
 
150 Thorp, 166 Or. App. at 590, 2 P.3d at 917 (Haselton, J., dissenting) (emphasis in 
original). 
151 Thorp, 166 Or. App. at 594, 2 P.3d at 919 (Haselton, J., dissenting). 
152 Thorp, 166 Or. App. at 594, 2 P.3d at 919 (Haselton, J., dissenting). 
153 Thorp, 166 Or. App. at 594–98, 2 P.3d at 919–21 (Haselton, J., dissenting). 
154 Thorp, 166 Or. App. at 598, 2 P.3d at 921 (Haselton, J., dissenting). 
155 State v. Wheeler, 343 Or. 652, 175 P.3d 438 (2007) (discussing Sustar). 
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could be found whose moral sense was not ‘shocked’ by that 
penalty.”156  Rather, the court stated, the Sustar court was attempting 
to articulate a standard that would “find a penalty to be 
disproportionately severe . . . only in rare circumstances.”157  To the 
extent that the majority and concurring opinions in Thorp 
emphasized—as they did in several places—the “all” in “all 
reasonable people,” they applied a test that is at least somewhat more 
stringent than that most recently used by the Oregon Supreme 
Court.158 
However, many aspects of Thorp stand as the Oregon appellate 
courts’ most detailed consideration of how the proportionality clause 
should be applied.159  The Oregon Supreme Court’s more recent 
decisions on proportionality, Wheeler and Ferman-Velasco, did not 
involve the same kind of detailed review of the circumstances of the 
crime and the parties or a comparison of the crime and the penalty, 
other crimes and their penalties, or crimes and penalties in other 
jurisdictions.  Indeed, the Oregon Supreme Court has not clearly 
indicated that the factors considered by the majority and dissenting 
opinions in Thorp—derived generally from Solem—are the controlling 
considerations.  In Wheeler, as noted, the court did give significant 
weight to the defendant’s prior felony sex crimes, indicating that 
 
156 Wheeler, 343 Or. at 670, 175 P.3d at 449. 
157 Wheeler, 343 Or. at 670, 175 P.3d at 449. 
158 See Wheeler, 343 Or. at 670, 175 P.3d at 449. 
159 In two recent Oregon Court of Appeals cases, decided before the Oregon Supreme 
Court’s decision in Wheeler, the court discussed several aspects of Thorp and Solem.  State 
v. Rodriguez, 217 Or. App. 351, 174 P.3d 1100 (2007), review allowed, 344 Or. 539, 186 
P.3d 285 (2008); State v. Buck, 217 Or. App. 363, 174 P.3d 1106 (2007), review allowed, 
344 Or. 539, 186 P.3d 285 (2008).  In both of those cases, the defendants were convicted 
of first-degree sex abuse, which carries a mandatory minimum sentence of seventy-five 
months imprisonment.  The trial judge in each case concluded that, as applied to each 
defendant and the circumstances of each case—both cases involved defendants without 
prior convictions and sexual touching that, the defendants argued, was at the less serious 
end of the spectrum of conduct prohibited by the sex abuse statute—the seventy-five-
month sentence violated the proportionality requirement of article I, section 16, and 
imposed a shorter sentence.  The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed both cases and 
imposed the mandatory minimum sentence.  The court stated that it would apply the Sustar 
“shock the moral sense of all reasonable people” test, Rodriguez, 217 Or. App. at 358, 174 
P.3d at 1104, but that if the court had “serious doubts” that the sentence might be 
unconstitutional under that test, it would examine the Solem factors.  217 Or. App. at 360, 
174 P.3d at 1105.  In Rodriguez and Buck, however, the court concluded that it did not 
have “serious doubts.”  Accordingly, the court looked only at “the gravity of the offense 
and the harshness of the penalty”—which it identified as the first Solem criterion and 
which it viewed as “central” to the “shock the moral sense” test.  Rodriguez, 217 Or. App. 
at 360, 174 P.3d at 1105. 
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recidivism is a relevant factor in applying the proportionality 
provision.160  The court in Wheeler also rejected the defendant’s 
claim that a life sentence without possibility of parole was 
disproportionate because his crimes did not involve a physical assault 
or result in permanent physical injury—in contrast to crimes that did 
involve such physical injury, but carried lesser penalties.  The court 
held that the legislature was entitled to presume that sex crimes pose 
the risk of physical and psychological injury and to decide that 
lengthy sentences for such crimes are necessary to protect the public 
from further harm by repeat offenders.161  Yet the court evidently felt 
that Wheeler did not present the kind of close question that would 
have required as detailed a circumstantial and comparative analysis as 
the Court of Appeals undertook in Thorp. 
CONCLUSION 
We end, in many respects, where we began.  The framers of the 
Oregon Constitution have told us that “all penalties shall be 
proportioned to the offense.”162  Although the historical background 
of this mandate suggests that it may be directed in the first instance to 
the legislature, settled principles of judicial review give the courts the 
authority to interpret and apply the provision and to hold 
unconstitutional statutes and sentences that are inconsistent with it.  
Beyond that, the view becomes less clear.  Oregon courts, like other 
state courts interpreting similar provisions, have adopted both a 
specific test under which related, but lesser crimes (typically a lesser-
included offense) may not be punished more severely than the 
greater-inclusive offense as well as a more general test (“shocks the 
moral sense”) that is deferential to the legislature but that provides 
little in the way of guidance for deciding whether a penalty is 
disproportionate. 
The difficulty of articulating meaningful standards for 
constitutional review of legislative action confronts the courts in 
many areas.  The federal constitution’s guarantees of “due process of 
law” and “equal protection of the law” and the Oregon Constitution’s 
protection of “equal privileges and immunities”163 and of a “remedy 
 
160 Wheeler, 343 Or. at 678, 175 P.3d at 453. 
161 Wheeler, 343 Or. at 679–80, 175 P.3d at 454. 
162 OR. CONST. art. I, § 16 (1857). 
163 Id. art. 1, § 20. 
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by due course of law for injury”164 are but a few of the most obvious 
examples.  Yet the courts have enforced these provisions in a 
meaningful way even when they have not yielded easily applicable 
standards. 
Blackstone insightfully observed that “the quantity of punishment 
can never be absolutely determined by any standing invariable 
rule,”165 and that teaching requires a substantial degree of judicial 
deference to the legislature to determine penalties “proportioned to 
the offense.”  But the inclusion of the proportionality provision in the 
Oregon Constitution also requires the courts to review these 
legislative determinations when challenged and, in the extreme case, 
to be willing to conclude that a particular penalty is invalid because it 
is not proportioned to the offense.  Only time will tell whether 
litigants can propose or the courts can articulate tests for determining 
proportionality that are less subjective or that provide more analytical 
structure than the stark “shocks the moral sense” standard of Sustar.  
We do know that proportionality cases will continue to come, and—
satisfactory tests or not—the courts will decide them. 
 
164 Id. art. 1, § 10. 
165 BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at 12. 
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